THE EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN AUDITOR CLIENTELE AND AUDITOR-CLIENT MISMATCHES ON AUDIT QUALITY by Bills, Kenneth
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN AUDITOR CLIENTELE AND 
AUDITOR-CLIENT MISMATCHES ON AUDIT QUALITY 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
KENNETH L. BILLS 
Norman, Oklahoma 
2012  
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN AUDITOR CLIENTELE AND 
AUDITOR-CLIENT MISMATCHES ON AUDIT QUALITY 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 
 MICHAEL F. PRICE COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
 
 
 ______________________________ 
 Dr. Kevan L. Jensen, Chair 
 
 
 ______________________________ 
 Dr. Louis H. Ederington 
 
 
    ______________________________ 
 Dr. Dipankar Ghosh 
 
 
     ______________________________ 
 Dr. Robert C. Lipe 
 
 
 ______________________________ 
 Dr. Wayne B. Thomas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by KENNETH BILLS 2012 
All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Jamie, who makes my life a joy to live and to my 
parents who have always encouraged me to do the best that I can at every worthwhile 
endeavor I choose to pursue.  
 
 
 iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Kevan Jensen, for all of his guidance, support, and 
friendship. He has shown consistent interest in my progress and has spent countless 
hours teaching me, supporting me through challenges, and providing helpful critiques. I 
am also truly grateful for the members of my dissertation committee: Louis Ederington, 
Dipankar Ghosh, Robert Lipe, and Wayne Thomas. They have given me not just 
direction and insight through the dissertation process, but examples of what it means to 
be an excellent academic.   
 
  
 v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
SECTION I. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 5 
 Relevant Auditing Research on Audit Firm Capacity .............................................. 5 
 Strained and Excess Capacity Caused by Major Changes in Local Audit Office 
Clientele .................................................................................................................... 8 
  Strained Capacity ................................................................................................ 8 
  Excess Capacity .................................................................................................. 9 
 Large Audit Firms’ Ability to Transfer Personnel and Reputational Concerns ....... 9 
 Changes in Local Audit Office Clientele and Audit Quality .................................. 12 
SECTION III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ......................................................... 15 
 Audit Quality........................................................................................................... 15 
 Audit Firm Size ....................................................................................................... 17 
 Portfolio Management Decisions ............................................................................ 18 
 Auditor-Client Mismatches ..................................................................................... 20 
SECTION IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY ................................ 21 
 Sample Selection ..................................................................................................... 21 
 Methodology ........................................................................................................... 24 
  Audit Quality ..................................................................................................... 24 
  Audit Firm Size.................................................................................................. 27 
  Portfolio Management Decisions ..................................................................... 28 
  Mismatch Effect on Audit Quality ..................................................................... 30 
SECTION V. RESULTS ................................................................................................ 31 
 Additional Robustness Checks, Additional Analyses, and Limitations .................. 35 
SECTION VI. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................... 36 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 39 
  
 vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1 Sample Sizes .................................................................................................. 45 
TABLE 2 Descriptive Data – GCO and DA Samples .................................................... 46 
TABLE 3 Correlation Tables – GCO and DA Samples ................................................. 47 
 
TABLE 4 Results of Going-Concern Opinion Error Test .............................................. 48 
 
TABLE 5 Results of Discretionary Accruals Test ......................................................... 49 
 
TABLE 6 Descriptive Data and Correlations for Hypothesis 3 Test Sample ................ 50 
 
TABLE 7 Results of Mismatch Test .............................................................................. 51 
 
TABLE 8 Descriptive Data and Correlations for Hypothesis 4 Test Sample ................ 52 
 
TABLE 9 Results of Discretionary Accruals-Mismatch Test ........................................ 53 
 
TABLE 10 Results of Discretionary Accruals-Mismatch Test ...................................... 54 
 
 
  
 vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1 Going Concern Opinion Decisions And Errors ........................................... 55 
 
  
 viii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study contributes to the current debate on mandatory audit firm rotation by 
investigating how possible consequences of mandating audit firm rotation may affect 
audit quality. I find that audit offices with large increases in their clientele (strained 
capacity) or decreases in their clientele (excess capacity) have significantly lower audit 
quality as measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. I find evidence of a 
smaller effect for larger audit firms with strained capacity supporting a reputational or 
flexibility hypothesis. Additionally, audit offices with strained capacity are more likely 
to issue going-concern opinions to companies that do not subsequently go bankrupt 
(Type I errors). I further investigate the effect of strained and excess capacity on an 
audit firm’s client acceptance decisions and find that mismatches, where a large audit 
firm accepts a client expected to be served by a small audit firm, are less likely to occur 
when a large audit firm has strained capacity. Finally, I investigate the effect of auditor-
client mismatches on audit quality. I find that audit quality is positively affected when a 
large audit firm performs the audit for a company expected to be served by a smaller 
audit firm and is negatively affected when a small audit firm performs the audit for a 
company expected to be served by a larger audit firm.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this study, I investigate the effects of strained and excess capacity on audit 
firms’ audit quality and portfolio management decisions. I also test whether such effects 
are contingent upon the size and structure of the audit firm. I further test whether 
auditor-client mismatches affect audit quality. This study is motivated in part by two 
important current issues being addressed by auditing regulators. The first is a current 
heated public discourse about mandatory rotation for auditors of public companies. 
Mandatory audit firm rotation would add volatility to audit firms’ clientele portfolios, 
potentially making it more difficult for audit firms to plan for, and adequately adjust 
their levels of available capacity. Additionally, mandatory audit firm rotation may 
increase the rate of auditor-client mismatches, especially where there are few rotation 
options available. Second, a technical committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) issued a paper in 2008 implying that regulators have 
serious concerns about the effects that significant changes in audit firm capacity may 
have on the audit market. My study seeks to provide evidence that will be useful to 
regulators and practitioners as they make decisions that affect the capacity of audit 
firms to provide audit services.  
On August 16, 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) issued a concept release requesting comments from the public about setting 
term limits for auditors of public companies (see PCAOB 2011). There are two camps 
arguing their side of this divisive issue. Both sides have strong opinions about the effect 
of audit firm tenure on audit quality, and their arguments are lengthy. The first camp is 
concerned about the coziness that may develop between public companies and what are 
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supposed to be their independent auditors as long-term relationships are established. 
The second camp argues that there may be no viable rotation opportunities for some 
companies, that the cost of audit firm rotation is high, and that the development of 
company-specific knowledge through longer auditor tenures may actually improve audit 
quality.1 My study provides evidence on an important consideration in this debate. 
Mandating audit firm rotation would result in significant fluctuations in audit firm client 
portfolios, which may make it difficult for audit firms to plan for and adequately adjust 
their levels of capacity. When an audit firm has significant fluctuations in its clientele 
resulting in either strained or excess capacity, it has the potential to impact audit quality 
and influence audit firms’ portfolio management decisions. My study provides evidence 
on these relations. Additionally, mandatory audit firm rotation may increase auditor-
client mismatches where larger audit firms perform the audits of clients expected to be 
served by smaller firms and vice versa. My study provides evidence about how such 
mismatches affect audit quality. 
A related issue which has concerned regulators is the concentration of audit 
firms and its implications for audit quality. With the SEC’s decision to effectively shut 
down Arthur Andersen, there has been considerable debate about the effects that 
disruptions in the capacity of a single audit firm to provide audit services may have on 
the audit market. In May 2008, a technical committee of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions issued a paper (IOSCO 2008) on contingency planning for 
                                                 
1 For research investigating the last claim, see Johnson et al. (2002), Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), 
Myers et al. (2003), and Ghosh and Moon (2005). 
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events and conditions that affect the availability of audit services.2 The IOSCO study 
considers catastrophic events that may result in the complete or partial removal of an 
international audit firm from a geographic area (e.g. the demise of Arther Anderson, 
ChuoAoyama, and Leventhal & Horwath). My study seeks to provide evidence that will 
be useful to regulators and practitioners as they make decisions that affect the ability of 
audit firms to provide audit services by examining more frequent, less severe changes in 
audit firm capacity. This may aid regulators in better understanding the market forces 
which take effect when there are changes in audit firm capacity.  
My study provides empirical evidence about the effects of city-level changes in 
audit firm capacity which occur due to significant changes in audit firms’ clientele. In 
this study, I use theory from the auditor reputation, production economics, operations 
management, and assortative matching literatures to develop hypotheses about the 
effects of strained and excess capacity on a local audit office’s audit quality and 
portfolio management decisions. I utilize significant changes in a local audit office’s 
clientele as a proxy for periods of strained and excess audit firm capacity. 
 I find that strained and excess capacity at audit offices result in lower audit 
quality as measured by absolute values of performance-matched discretionary accruals. 
I also find evidence that the negative effect of strained capacity is smaller for clients 
audited by the Big 4 or second-tier audit firms.3 Results further show that strained 
capacity at audit offices results in a greater number of Type I going-concern opinion 
                                                 
2 Membership in the IOSCO includes securities commissions or principal financial regulators from over 
100 member countries. IOSCO (2008) emphasizes regulators’ concerns about the effects of significant 
changes in the available capacity of audit firms. 
3 In this study, second-tier audit firms include Grant Thornton, BDO Seidman, McGladrey & Pullen, and 
Crowe Horwath. These audit firms and the Big 4 audit firms are those required to be inspected by the 
PCAOB on an annual basis. 
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errors, however, neither strained nor excess capacity is associated with the occurrence 
of Type II going-concern opinion errors.   
  Additional results show that strained capacity results in a lower likelihood of 
auditor-client mismatches where a client that is expected to be served by a small audit 
firm is served by a large audit firm. Results further show that clients expected to be 
served by small audit firms that are served by large audit firms have lower absolute 
values of discretionary accruals even after matching on probability of selecting a large 
audit firm. Finally, in a matched sample design, results indicate that clients typically 
served by large audit firms that are served by smaller audit firms have greater absolute 
values of discretionary accruals. 
This study contributes to current literature in a number of ways. First, it 
addresses an area of concern for both the PCAOB and the IOSCO. It adds to the audit 
firm portfolio management literature by investigating the effects of significant increases 
and decreases in clientele on local offices’ client-acceptance decisions. Further, it 
provides evidence on the differential effects of audit market changes on Big 4 and 
second-tier audit firms versus smaller firms. Finally, this study investigates the effects 
of two types of auditor-client misalignments on audit quality. 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II summarizes the 
background literature and key concepts that are important to this study. Section III 
describes the development of testable hypotheses. Section IV describes the sample used 
in this study and illustrates the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Section V 
illustrates results, robustness checks, and limitations of the study. Section VI 
summarizes and concludes. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Audit firms are similar to other service firms in that they provide a perishable 
asset. That is, they employ a workforce with the capacity to provide labor inputs that 
expire if not used (Sasser 1976; Weatherford and Bodily 1992). As such, audit firms are 
faced with important decisions that affect the capacity of their firms to provide audit 
services. These decisions include those that affect the levels of available inputs such as 
decisions about staffing, length of working-days, and firm expansion. These decisions 
affect the efficient use of available inputs, such as use of technology, training, 
incentives, and allocation of resources. Auditing firms then make decisions about the 
supply of their firms’ services through client-acceptance and continuance decisions. 
External forces such as changes in economic conditions and client-initiated changes 
also impact an audit firm’s capacity to provide services.  
 Considering the market for assurance services broadly as a dynamic and 
complex set of matching and resource allocation decisions, factors that affect audit firm 
capacity have the potential to significantly impact all parts of the audit industry. For 
example, factors that affect an audit firm’s capacity, be it through choice or external 
forces, have a direct impact on an audit firm’s short- and long-term profitability as well 
as on its current and future opportunity set. In addition, such factors may have direct 
and indirect effects on such important areas as audit quality, competition, portfolio 
management, audit pricing, and industry specialization. In light of this, extant auditing 
research has just brushed the surface of investigating the impact that auditor capacity 
has in the audit market.  
Prior studies related to the demand for audit services operationalize differences 
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in the demand on audit firm capacity by either using audit firms’ peak versus nonpeak 
periods or by utilizing a quasi-experimental setting where there is an external shock 
which causes a significant change in the demand for audit services. In the following 
pages, I summarize prior literature on these measures and provide background 
information about how differences in the demand on audit firm capacity relate to audit 
quality and auditor portfolio management decisions.  
Relevant Auditing Research on Audit Firm Capacity 
 There is substantial research which investigates the potential negative 
consequences of audit work being performed during an auditor’s peak period (“busy 
season”) and potential benefits of audit work performed during the nonpeak period. Hay 
et al. (2006) provide a useful summary of this line of literature. For auditors of public 
and nonpublic companies, this peak period is driven by the fact that the majority of 
these companies have December 31 year ends. For auditors of governmental agencies 
and not-for-profits, the peak period is due to the majority of these entities having a June 
30 year end. In essence, busy season is a “bottleneck,” or a stage in which the 
performance of a system is constrained (Mukherjee and Chatterjee 2006). Specifically, 
although the capacity of an audit firm may be used at or near its fullest extent during 
busy season, capacity is not sufficient to keep work from piling up.   
Two studies provide some evidence about the effect of auditor’s busy season on 
audit quality. Johnstone and Bedard (2001) find weak evidence that less audit effort is 
used for busy season audits. If auditor effort is positively correlated with audit quality, 
then these results suggest that audit quality may be lower for busy season clients. 
Lambert et al. (2011) find, however, that while increasing time pressure is positively 
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correlated with discretionary accruals, this relation is not greater during busy season. 
Regarding the effect of the busy season bottleneck on auditors’ client acceptance 
decisions, Lopez et al. (2008) provide evidence that audit firms with client portfolios 
with workload heavily compressed during busy season (workload compression) are less 
likely to accept more busy season clients.  Lopez and Peters (2011) provide evidence 
that auditor switches are more likely for audit firms with greater workload compression.  
 My study differs from these busy season studies in that it investigates the effect 
of excess and strained capacity in the context of significant changes in an audit firm’s 
portfolio as opposed to an audit cycle bottleneck. In addition, I test characteristics of 
clients that will be selected under strained and excess capacity that have not been 
previously explored. My study further differs in that it investigates whether audit firm 
size affects the actions of local audit offices with excess or strained capacity.  
One non-busy season study which investigates the effect of audit firm capacity 
constraints is Landsman et al. (2009). This study provides evidence that capacity 
constraints on audit firms due to the demise of Arthur Andersen and the influx of their 
clientele to other audit firms as well as the increased demands of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act resulted in an increased likelihood that high quality audit firms would shed clients 
with whom they were misaligned. Misalignments are defined as auditor-client 
alignments where high quality auditors are serving a client which is expected to be 
served by a lower quality auditor and vice versa. The results of Landsman et al. (2009) 
support the clientele-adjustment hypothesis (Johnson and Lys 1990; Shu 2000) that 
auditor switches are driven by changes over time in economic conditions and market 
competition.  
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My study differs from the Landsman et al. (2009) study in that I evaluate 
mismatches that occur at initial client acceptance as opposed to mismatches that occur 
as the characteristics of an audit client change over time. Unlike Landsman et al. 
(2009), strained capacity in this study is measured at the city level and is due to extreme 
changes in a local audit office’s clientele as opposed to an external shock to the entire 
audit market. Further, my study is the first to investigate the effect that auditor-client 
mismatches have on audit quality. 
Strained and Excess Capacity Caused by Major Changes in Local Audit Office 
Clientele  
Strained Capacity 
 When local audit offices substantially expand their client base in a short period 
of time, they are likely to strain their capacity to provide audit services. There are 
several actions that local audit offices can take to reduce capacity strain such as hiring 
and outsourcing; however, successfully eliminating all capacity strain in the short term 
is unlikely when extreme changes in local audit office clientele occur. As in many 
service industries, auditing firms often build some degree of “cushion” into their 
available capacity that allows them to capitalize on new revenue opportunities. They 
also may have a limited amount of “flexible capacity,” or the ability to use current 
employee overtime and/or outsourced services (Fine and Freund 1990; Gans and Zhou 
2002). However, large increases in a local audit office’s clientele would quickly 
subsume or at least put a significant strain on these two forms of reserved capacity. 
Audit firms may also expand their capacity through hiring. Both internal and market 
constraints such as the ability to hire, train, supervise, and retain employees, however, 
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make it  difficult for audit firms to obtain large, rapid growth in their capacity through 
hiring.  
Excess Capacity 
When audit firms lose clientele either due to auditor or client choice, managing 
partners of these firms are left with the decision of how to deal with the resulting excess 
capacity. Available short-term options include seeking new engagements, allowing 
attrition, laying off employees, maintaining excess capacity, transferring employees, or 
some combination of the various options. Among these options, attrition is a relatively 
slow solution. While laying off employees is a quick way to eliminate excess capacity 
and is used occasionally in the auditing profession, it has significant costs. These costs 
include upsetting those terminated, remaining employees, potential future hires, 
suppliers of future hires, clients, and the community.4 In addition, if the cost of laying 
off additional employees is nonlinear (increasing at an increasing rate) then the optimal 
level of workforce reduction may still include some degree of excess capacity.  
Large Audit Firms’ Ability to Transfer Personnel and Reputational Concerns 
Local offices of the Big 4 and second-tier audit firms have an additional 
resource for addressing capacity needs that small audit firms do not have. The national 
offices at these firms are empowered to transfer personnel between local audit offices to 
where the need for personnel is greatest. This ability may reduce the likelihood that a 
significant change in audit firm clientele would lead to either strained or excess 
capacity. The ability to transfer personnel is constrained, however, by the willingness of 
employees to relocate. 
                                                 
4  For example, see Harrington (2010). 
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 In addition to differences in personnel management, the Big 4 and second-tier 
audit firms also have different reputational concerns than smaller audit firms. DeAngelo 
(1981b) introduces the theory that audit firm size is a valid proxy for audit quality 
because larger audit firms have “more to lose” in the form of quasi rents. Theoretically, 
quasi rents can be obtained by incumbent auditors because of the existence of 
significant switching costs. An incumbent auditor can charge clients more than the 
avoidable cost of an audit (can charge quasi rents) as long as the additional audit fees 
are less than the cost of switching. Large audit firms collecting quasi rents from a 
sizeable portfolio of clientele will then have a greater incentive to maintain 
independence and reduce audit risk related to any individual client. 
A substantial amount of research supports this theory. Palmrose (1988) provides 
empirical evidence that Big 8 auditors are less likely to be litigated for malpractice than 
non-Big 8 auditors. Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) find that clients of Big 8 auditors 
have fewer accounting errors as revealed in prior period adjustments. Davidson and Neu 
(1993) find that clients of Big 8 auditors have smaller earnings forecast errors. Teoh and 
Wong (1993) show that clients of Big 8 auditors have statistically greater earnings 
response coefficients than clients of non-Big 8 auditors. Francis et al. (1999) and 
Becker et al. (1998) show that firms audited by Big 6 auditors have smaller amounts of 
discretionary accruals. Nelson et al. (2002) show that clients of non-Big 5 auditors are 
more likely to just meet-or-beat analyst forecasts. Hammersley et al. (2007) find that 
negative market reactions to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses are lower in 
magnitude when a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor. Lennox and Pittman (2010) show 
that clients of Big 5 auditors are less likely to be investigated by the SEC for fraudulent 
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financial reporting. 
 In addition to Big 4/5/6/8 (hereafter Big 4) auditors, there are so-called “second-
tier” auditors. These are international audit firms including Grant Thorton, BDO 
Seidman, McGladery and Pullen, and Crowe Horwath which have national offices, but 
are smaller than the Big 4.  Like the Big 4, these audit firms are required to be inspected 
by the PCAOB on an annual basis. Evidence suggests that historically, these firms may 
have been perceived as having lower audit quality than Big 4 audit firms (Khurana and 
Raman 2004). Follow up studies, however, provide evidence that subsequent to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the quality of audits provided by second-tier audit 
firms is not significantly different from the quality of audits provided by Big 4 firms 
both in fact and in perception. Weber and Willenborg (2003) reveal that opinions issued 
by second-tier audit firms are “comparably predictive to those of the Big 4.” Cassell et 
al. (2011) find that after SOX, the ERCs of firms audited by second-tier auditors are not 
significantly different from those of firms audited by Big 4 firms. Krishnan et al. (2008) 
show that from the period 1998-2006, switching from a Big 4 auditor to a second-tier 
auditor did not result in an increase in abnormal accruals. Boone et al. (2010) replicate 
these results from the period 2003-2006 and further show that clients of Big 4 auditors 
and second-tier auditors have statistically similar ex ante costs of equity capital.  
However, they also find weak evidence that Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue 
going-concern opinions to distressed companies than second-tier firms. 
Both Big 4 and second-tier auditors have formal structures and procedures in 
place to protect their reputations. They have established national offices which have a 
say in the client acceptance and client retention decisions of each local audit office. 
 12 
 
National offices have an incentive to protect the reputation of the overall firm by 
reducing the audit risk related to any individual audit office. At times, and perhaps more 
often than might be expected, the national offices of these audit firms reject clients that 
local audit offices would otherwise accept.5 Additionally, the Big 4 and second-tier 
audit firms have formal, internally-developed client acceptance procedures and audit 
pricing strategies which are developed at the national office level and mandated by firm 
policy.  
In summary, considerable evidence exists that is consistent with the theory that 
the Big 4 and second-tier audit firms act to protect their reputation. There are then two 
distinct hypotheses which predict that local audit offices of the Big 4 and second-tier 
audit firms will be less affected by strained capacity than small audit firms. As 
discussed previously, the first hypothesis is that the Big 4 and second-tier audit firms 
have more flexibility to reduce strained capacity through transferring employees 
between local audit offices (flexibility hypothesis). The second hypothesis is that 
reputational concerns may result in constraints on the engagement performance and 
client-acceptance criteria of local audit offices of the Big 4 and second-tier audit firms 
(reputation hypothesis). Both the reputation and flexibility hypotheses predict that the 
effects of strained capacity on local audit offices’ audit quality and client acceptance 
decisions will be smaller for local audit offices of the Big 4 and second-tier audit firms.  
Changes in Local Audit Office Clientele and Audit Quality  
I now consider the effects that significant increases in local audit office clientele 
                                                 
5 Rejection rates of the Big 4 and other audit firms are not publicly available, although personal 
conversations with several audit partners from firms with national offices have suggested that rejections 
by the national office occur frequently at different stages of the client acceptance process. 
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may have on audit quality. I begin this literature review in the production economics 
literature. Lovelock (1984) and Sridharan (1998) describe the difficult task faced by 
managers of maintaining delivery dependability and quality in tightly constrained 
systems. For many service firms, capacity constraints lead to deterioration in quality. 
For example, in the restaurant industry, the service received by patrons generally 
declines as a restaurant reaches its full capacity. Likewise, customers at a mechanics 
shop may expect delays and poorer service when the shop is full.   
Further analyzing these last two examples, strained capacity appears to 
potentially affect both a customer’s “experience” as well as the “effectiveness” of the 
service.  In a highly influential study, Parasuraman et al. (1985) outline the following 
ten distinguishable components to service quality: responsiveness, courtesy, access, 
communication, tangibles, security, credibility, competence, reliability, and 
understanding of the customer. While capacity constraints may put a strain on any or all 
of these ten components, I focus on the credibility, competence, and reliability of the 
audited financial statements which are similar to attributes of audit quality defined by 
DeAngelo (1981b). DeAngelo (1981b) describes audit quality as having two 
components. The first is the probability that the auditor will detect a material 
misstatement (competence). The second is the probability that the auditor will report 
the material misstatement (credibility and reliability). 
Prior literature is mixed about whether strained auditor capacity has a significant 
impact on audit quality. Agoglia et al. (2010) provide evidence contrary to the 
hypothesis that audit quality is negatively affected by strained capacity. In a survey and 
experimental setting, they investigate the method of communication used by managers’ 
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to communicate the results of reviews to audit staff. Prior literature has found that the 
use of in-person communication as opposed to electronic communication contributes to 
audit effectiveness (Brazel et al. 2004).  Agoglia et al. (2010) find that reviewers are 
more likely to communicate via electronic means during busy season only when risk of 
misstatement is low. When risk of misstatement is high, managers communicate the 
results of their reviews in person. 
On the contrary, Houston (1999) provides evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that audit quality is affected by capacity constraints. This study shows that fee pressure 
induces less responsiveness by auditors to increased risk in terms of both risk 
assessment and budgeted audit hours. In this study, audit seniors prepare a preliminary 
risk assessment for an audit engagement and create a preliminary time budget for audit 
procedures to be performed. The risk level of the audit engagement is then manipulated 
upward and those audit seniors where fee pressure is induced adjust their risk 
assessments and time budgets upward less than those audit seniors where fee pressure is 
not induced. 
 In summary, whether strained and excess audit firm capacity affect audit quality 
is an empirical question. In this study, I test whether local audit offices with strained 
(excess) capacity have lower (higher) audit quality as measured by both going concern 
opinion errors and the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals. I 
also test an alternative hypothesis that strained (excess) capacity will strengthen 
(weaken) an audit firm’s negotiating power resulting in higher (lower) audit quality.  I 
further test whether the effect of strained and excess capacity on audit quality is smaller 
for local audit offices of the Big 4 and second-tier audit firms due to reputational 
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concerns and/or their ability to transfer personnel between offices.  
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Audit Quality 
Mandating audit firm rotation has the potential to cause serious fluctuation in the 
work performed by audit firms. Such fluctuations may leave local audit offices with 
either too little or too much capacity. When an audit firm has strained capacity, there 
may be significant audit quality implications. Similar to fee pressure, capacity strain 
motivates audit firms to complete tasks quickly and efficiently. Efficiency per se should 
have no effect on audit quality; however, if capacity strain induces less responsiveness 
to increased risk, then there may be negative audit quality implications. Alternatively, 
audit firms with strained capacity due to a significant increase in clientele may have 
more negotiating power due to the reduced need to maintain individual clients 
(Reynolds and Francis 2000). Greater negotiating power may then result in a greater 
ability to issue going-concern opinions and compel clients to make adjustments to their 
financial statements resulting in greater audit quality.  
 Similar to strained capacity, excess capacity could have positive or negative 
effects on audit quality. Excess capacity weakens an audit firm’s negotiating power and 
provides an incentive to maintain current clients and fill excess capacity. To do so, local 
audit offices with excess capacity may relax their audit quality in order to induce 
potential clients to acquire their services and persuade current clients against switching 
audit firms. Alternatively, fewer capacity constraints may result in more time to devote 
to making better judgments.  I propose the following non-directional hypothesis stated 
in null form.   
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H1: Companies audited by local audit offices with strained (excess) capacity 
will have audit quality similar to companies audited by local audit offices 
without strained (excess) capacity. 
In this study, I use two approaches to measure audit quality. For the first 
approach, I estimate the likelihood of Type I and Type II going-concern opinion errors.6 
Audit firms use the going concern explanatory paragraph to express their opinion about 
a client’s financial health. Type I errors occur when an audit firm issues a going concern 
opinion and a client does not subsequently go bankrupt within a year. Type II errors 
occur when an audit firm does not issue a going-concern opinion and the client 
subsequently goes bankrupt. Fewer errors of either type are an indication of greater 
audit quality, although Type II errors are generally considered more severe.  
Audit firms have competing incentives regarding issuing going concern opinions 
that can bias their decisions. On the one hand, audit firms can reduce their risk of 
litigation by issuing going concern opinions to financially stressed clients (Carcello and 
Palmrose 1994) whether such an opinion is deemed appropriate or not. In addition, 
failure to issue a going concern opinion to a client that subsequently goes bankrupt may 
result in damage to an audit firm’s reputation as it is perceived as a signal of low audit 
quality. On the other hand, clients are more likely to dismiss auditors that issue them a 
going concern opinion (Krishnan 1994). These competing incentives can be described 
as a risk-versus-relationship dilemma.  
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between an audit firm’s decision of whether or 
not to issue a going concern opinion and audit quality. Type I errors result under one of 
                                                 
6 I treat Type I and Type II errors separately because the causes and incentives for their occurrence are 
different. These incentives are discussed in detail below. 
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two conditions: 1) the audit firm issues a going concern opinion when one was not 
necessary because of poor judgment or 2) the audit firm does not deem it necessary to 
issue a going concern opinion, but does so in order to reduce the audit firm’s litigation 
risk. The first condition relates to DeAngelo’s (1981a) first component of audit quality, 
the failure to detect.  The second condition relates to DeAngelo’s (1981a) second 
component of audit quality, the failure to report correctly. Similarly, Type II errors 
occur either due to an audit firm’s failure to detect the need for a going-concern opinion 
or the failure to report one when it was deemed necessary due to relationship concerns.  
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 As a second measure of audit quality, I use a measure of discretionary accruals 
based on the model derived in Jones (1991) and further modified by Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). Discretionary accruals provide a broad measure of 
audit quality which is not restricted to extremes. In addition, accrual-based measures 
have been found to be significantly correlated with the occurrence of fraud (Jones et al. 
2008).  
Audit Firm Size 
As previously described, there are two distinct hypotheses which predict that 
local audit offices of the Big 4 and second-tier audit firms will react less to strained and 
excess capacity caused by extreme changes in clientele. The first hypothesis is that the 
Big 4 and second-tier audit firms are able to react to capacity changes by transferring 
personnel between local offices, a capability that smaller audit firms do not have. The 
second hypothesis is that national offices of these local offices protect the reputation of 
the entire audit firm by managing the performance standards and client acceptance 
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decisions of each local audit office. I propose the following hypothesis stated in 
alternate form to jointly test these theories. 
H2: The effects of strained (excess) capacity on audit quality will be smaller 
for Big 4 and second-tier audit firms than for other firms. 
Portfolio Management Decisions 
In an operational sense, capacity considerations can affect the order in which a 
business selects the jobs it will perform. Such is the case with “make-to-order” 
manufacturing firms (Sridharan 1998). Make-to-order manufacturing firms are similar 
to service firms in that they hold capacity in stock as opposed to inventory. Under 
strained capacity, make-to-order manufacturing firms must discriminate between 
different customers, resulting in the rejection of some orders for lower priority products. 
Likewise, audit firms with strained capacity cannot accept all requests for their services. 
Capacity strained audit firms may then be extra selective in determining those 
companies that they will serve. The opposite is true for audit firms with excess capacity. 
Bills and Jensen (2011) provide evidence that 1) audit firms prefer to serve 
higher quality companies and 2) the ability of audit firms to be selective of the clients 
they serve increases as the demand on audit firm capacity is increased. These results 
support the hypothesis that the audit market follows a two-sided matching approach 
known as positive assortative matching (PAM). This approach or model is in contrast to 
one-sided matching models such as signaling models which have been used to describe 
how audit clients alone select the audit firm that will perform their audit. Matching 
decisions are defined by a market with multiple parties where members from each party 
must make decisions about who they will pair with from another party, such as with 
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audit firms and potential audit clients. When members from each party have limited 
pairing capacity (such as audit clients only needing one auditor and audit firms only 
having the capacity to serve a limited number of clients) and when members from each 
party can be ranked from most preferred to least preferred based on one or more 
characteristics, the preferences of both parties will drive how pairing will occur. PAM 
occurs when members from differing parties match on characteristics that both prefer. 
Under this model, the most preferred partners will be paired first, the second most 
preferred partners will be paired second, and this matching continues until the pairing 
capacity of all members of at least one party is used up. For example, Bills and Jensen 
(2011) provide evidence that audit firms prefer higher quality clients and clients prefer 
higher quality auditors resulting in higher quality audit firms matching with higher 
quality companies and lower quality audit firms matching with lower quality 
companies. 
Other than company quality, there are other characteristics for which audit firms 
have a preference. Prior literature has shown that there are significant differences in the 
characteristics of clients that are expected to be served by larger audit firms and those 
expected to be served by smaller audit firms. Shu (2000) introduces a methodology for 
determining the likelihood a company will be served by a large audit firm and for 
determining where auditor-client mismatches are present.7  Results of Shu (2000) 
indicate that when mismatches occur through changes in the characteristics of audit 
clients that it increases the likelihood that the audit firm will resign from the audit 
engagement. These results indicate that mismatches may not be favorable to audit firms. 
                                                 
7 This likelihood is similar to the “propensity score” discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008) and 
Lawrence et al. (2011) which can be used to correct for selection bias. 
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Consistent with the findings from these studies, I expect that auditor-client 
mismatches are less likely to occur when an audit firm has strained capacity and can be 
more selective and are more likely to occur when an audit firm has excess capacity and 
cannot be as selective. Positive assortative matching theory would suggest that, all else 
equal, the likelihood of mismatches occurring would be lower when audit firm’s 
capacity is strained. Alternatively, when an audit firm has excess capacity, it may be 
willing to accept clients it would not typically serve. As such, I propose the following 
testable hypothesis.  
H3: Auditor-client mismatches are less (more) likely to occur when an audit 
firm has strained (excess) capacity. 
Auditor-Client Mismatches 
As shown by Shu (2000) and others, characteristics of clients generally served 
by larger audit firms are different than characteristics of clients generally served by 
small audit firms. Mismatches exist when large audit firms serve clients expected to be 
served by small audit firms and vice versa. Mandatory audit firm rotation may increase 
the rate of auditor-client mismatches, especially where there are few rotation options 
available. Whether such mismatches have an effect on audit quality is an empirical 
question.  
Prior research has shown that audits provided by larger audit firms result in 
greater audit quality (e.g. Francis et al. 1999; Nelson et al. 2002; Hammersley et al. 
2007). Recently, Lawrence et al. (2011) questions whether these results are robust when 
a matched sample design is used. Lawrence et al. (2011) match on several different 
factors including propensity score (the likelihood that a client will be audited by a large 
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audit firm); however, they match all clients not served by the Big 4 to clients served by 
the Big 4 and do not identify mismatches or differentiate between the two types of 
mismatches. I propose the following two testable hypotheses.   
H4a: Auditor-client mismatches where clients expected to be served by large 
audit firms are served by small audit firms have lower audit quality than 
where no mismatches are present. 
H4b: Auditor-client mismatches where clients expected to be served by small 
audit firms are served by large audit firms have higher audit quality than 
where no mismatches are present. 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
Table 1 illustrates the samples used in this study. Audit fee and opinion data are 
available from the Audit Analytics database beginning in the year 2000. In order to 
avoid the changing dynamics of the audit industry around the implementation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the movement of Arthur Anderson’s clients to other 
auditors, I exclude years 2000 through 2003 and include only the years 2004 through 
2009 in my sample. I merge the Audit Analytics data set with the Compustat Industrial 
Annual database and eliminate observations where Compustat data are unavailable. My 
initial sample consists ofzz 42,193 client-year observations with Audit Analytics and 
Compustat data.8 I correct 526 of these client-year observations which have either the 
incorrect auditor city or the incorrect auditor in the Audit Analytics database. Errors 
were found by scanning client-year observations and investigating 10-K’s where logical 
                                                 
8 Where I calculated assets audited in an MSA, I use the full Audit Analytics fee file and do not eliminate 
observations that are missing Compustat data.  
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discrepancies were identified.9 I identify an additional 3,495 client-year observations in 
the Audit Analytics database which are missing auditor city information and am able to 
add auditor city information to 3,355 of these observations resulting in a total sample of 
45,547 client-year observations.10 I add to this sample bankruptcy information from the 
UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database which was kindly provided upon 
request.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
After calculating my measures of strained and excess capacity (described in 
detail below), I eliminate years 2004 and 2005 from the sample because two years of 
prior data are required for the measurements of strained and excess capacity. Because 
clients in the financial industry (SIC codes 60-69) have different financial statement 
characteristics than nonfinancial clients, I exclude these from my sample.  
Two factors that may undesirably affect the measures of strained and excess 
capacity are audit firm mergers and audit offices with very little audit work from public 
companies. Because I measure strained and excess capacity by relative percentage 
change in assets audited, audit office mergers disrupt this measurement. I hand collected 
a dataset of audit firm mergers at the local audit office level from multiple sources.11 I 
exclude from my sample all observations that were audited by audit offices identified at 
the local level as having merged with an audit office of another audit firm during the 
                                                 
9 For example, if Audit Analytics identifies only one audit by an audit firm in a city, I investigate 10-K’s 
to determine whether the auditor city identified by Audit Analytics is incorrect. 
10 I first use logical steps to add auditor city information to 2,311 of these observations. For example, if 
auditor city information is missing from a firm-year observation and the audit firm performing the 
company’s audit for that year has only one audit office, then I add the city of the one audit office to the 
observation. I then hand collect auditor city information from 10-K filings for an additional 1,044 
observations. 
11 Sources of audit firm mergers include the PCAOB’s report on name changes of registered public 
accounting firms (PCAOB 2010), reports from Compliance Week (Compliance Week 2008, 2009, 2010), 
and investigation of audit firm changes identified in Audit Analytics through Google searches.  
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sample period.12 Also, audit offices in my sample with few public audit clients are 
disproportionately likely to have significant changes in total assets audited due to their 
relatively small size which may lead to the measures of strained and excess capacity 
capturing an audit office size effect. It is doubtful that all the small audit offices that 
would be indicated as having strained or excess capacity according to the measures used 
in this study truly have strained or excess capacity. For this reason, I eliminate audit 
offices that have fewer than three audit clients.  
An alternative explanation for a correlation between stained and excess capacity 
and audit quality is that those audit firms identified as having strained capacity are also 
likely to have a larger proportion of initial year audits. Prior research has shown that 
initial year audit engagements have greater amounts of discretionary accruals (Myers et 
al. 2003) and greater amounts of going-concern errors (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). 
In order to control for this possible explanation, I eliminate all initial year audits from 
my GCO and DC samples and include only continuing audit engagements.13 Finally, I 
limit my sample to those clients that are financially distressed (described in detail 
below), resulting in a final sample of 8,845 client-years that I use to test H1 and H2 
using going-concern opinions (GCO sample).  
Table 1 further illustrates how I reach my final samples for testing H1 and H2 
using discretionary accruals (DA sample) and each of the remaining hypotheses. All 
continuous variables in each sample are winsorized at their 1% extremes.   
                                                 
12 I do not exclude only merger years and the years just prior and after the merger years because the exact 
dates of the mergers and detail about their implementation were largely unavailable. 
13 Untabulated results are similar if initial year audits are not eliminated. 
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Methodology 
Audit Quality 
 My first set of hypotheses relates to the impact of excess and strained local audit 
office capacity on audit quality. As described previously, I use the likelihood of a Type 
I and Type II going concern opinion error as an initial measure of audit quality. I restrict 
my sample to financially distressed companies where financial distress is defined as 
having one of the following: 1) negative operating cash flows (Compustat variable 
OANCF), 2) a net loss (Compustat variable NI), 3) negative retained earnings 
(Compustat variable RE) in the current or previous two years, or 4) negative working 
capital (Compustat variable WCAP) in the current or previous two years (Hopwood et 
al. 1994). Similar to Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007), I estimate the following model 
under two specifications with the dependent variables being either Type I or Type II 
errors.  
ERRORit = μ0 + μ1STRAINft + μ2EXCESSft + μ3LTAit + μ4Zit + μ5ΔZit + μ6AFEESit (1) 
+ μ7NFEESit + μ8GDPit + μ9ΔGDPit + μ10DECYEit + μjYearit + μkIndustryit + εit  
where, 
ERRORit = 1 if a Type I error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if a Type II error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
STRAINft = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a 
percentage increase in metropolitan statistical area (MSA) total assets 
audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 14,15 
                                                 
14 Geographic cities are classified by MSA using the U.S. Census Bureau’s MSA cross-map that can be 
found at 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/maps/msa_maps2008/msa2008_previews_html/cbsa_us_wall_1108.ht
ml. 
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EXCESSft = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a 
percentage decrease in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 
calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 
LTAit = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
Zit = Altman’s (2000) z-score for nonmanufacturing firms ranked from 0 to 9 
by two-digit SIC code where Z-score= 6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 
(X3) + 1.05 (X4), where X1 is working capital divided by total assets, 
X2 is retained earnings divided by total assets, X3 is earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets, and X4 is market value 
of equity divided by book value of total liabilities. 
ΔZit = change in a company’s Altman’s Z-score from t-1 to t; 
AFEESit = log of total audit fees paid by company i for a first year audit 
engagement; 
NFEESit = log of total nonaudit fees plus one; 
GDPit = yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ΔGDPit = change in yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
DECYEit = 1 if the company has a December fiscal year end, zero otherwise; 
Yeart = year dummy variables; 
Industryk = industry dummy variables by two-digit SIC code; 
The variables of interest are STRAIN and EXCESS. H1 predicts either a 
positive or negative coefficient on these variables. Control variables are similar to those 
                                                                                                                                               
15 Local audit office capacity could have been modeled as a single continuous variable or a variable 
having a value of 1, 0, or -1 if the local audit office had strained, normal, or excess capacity, respectively; 
however, doing so would assume a symmetric effect for both strained and excess capacity. The approach 
used to measure excess and strained capacity in my study was chosen because it allows more information 
about the effects to be shown. 
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in Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007). Client total assets (LTA) are included to control for 
size effects. Z and ΔZ are included to control for each client’s level of and change in 
bankruptcy risk. Local economic conditions are controlled for by including yearly gross 
domestic product by population (GDP) and change in GDP (ΔGDP) in the auditor’s 
MSA.16 Finally, whether the company has a December fiscal year end (DECYE) is 
included in the model in order to control for the effect peak period may have on local 
audit office’s capacity. 
 As a second test of H1, I use a measure of discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
audit quality. To estimate discretionary accruals, I employ the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995):  
ACC୧,୲
ATA୧,୲ ൌ	∝ଵ൅	∝ଶ
ሺ∆REV୧,୲ 	െ 	∆REC୧,୲ሻ
ATA୧,୲ ൅	∝ଷ
PPE୧,୲
ATA୧,୲ ൅	ε୧,୲	
I further modify this model by matching each firm-year observation with another 
observation from the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest return on assets 
as in Kothari et al. (2005).17 Reynolds and Francis (2000) express that in the absence of 
a prediction about the direction of accrual manipulation that unsigned accruals should 
be used. The magnitude of unsigned accruals captures a company's success in managing 
earnings either up or down (Healy 1985; DeFond and Park 1997).  I therefore use the 
absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals and estimate the 
following model which includes variables shown to be correlated with discretionary 
accruals: 
ABSPDAit = β0 + β1STRAINft + β2EXCESSft + β3LTAit + β4CFOit + β5LEVit  (3) 
                                                 
16 Historical data on gross domestic product by population for U.S. MSA’s was obtained from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s web page. 
17 Results of this study are robust to the use of the absolute value of Dechow et al.’s (1995) modified 
Jones model (nonperformance adjusted).  
(2) 
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+ β6MKTBKit + β7DECYEit + βjYeart + εit  
where, 
ABSPDAit   = absolute value of performance matched discretionary accruals, 
 
CFOit   = operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets, 
 
LEVit = total long-term debt caled by total assets, 
 
MKTBKit  = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at year 
end. 
and all other variables are as previously defined. 
 The variables of interest are STRAIN and EXCESS. H1 predicts that β1 (β2) will 
be positive if strained (excess) capacity results in lower audit quality or negative if 
strained (excess) capacity results in greater audit quality. Client size (LTA) and cash 
flow from operations (CFO) are included in the model as in Becker et al. (1998). 
Leverage (LEV) is included as companies with greater levels of debt have a greater 
incentive to manipulate earnings (Reynolds and Francis 2000). Market-to-book ratio 
(MKTBK) is included as a measure of company growth as companies that are growing 
rapidly may have a greater incentive to manage accruals to maintain the appearance of 
growth. Finally, whether the company has a December fiscal year end (DECYE) is 
included in the model in order to control for the effect that audit timing has on local 
audit office’s capacity. 
Audit Firm Size 
 To test H2, I add to models 1 and 3 an indicator variable, LGAUDITOR, which 
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is equal to one if a client is audited by a Big 4 or second tier auditor, zero otherwise.18 I 
further interact each variable of interest (STRAIN and EXCESS) and each control 
variable with LGAUDITOR and add the interactions to the model as follow:  
ERRORit = μ0 + μ1STRAINft + μ2EXCESSft + μ3LGAUDITORt + μ4STRAINLGft (4) 
+ μ5EXCESSLGft + μ6LTAit + μ7Zit + μ8ΔZit + μ9AFEESit + μ10NFEESit + μ11GDPit  
+ μ12ΔGDPit + μ13DECYEit + μ14LTALGit + μ15ZLGit + μ16ΔZLGit + μ17AFEESLGit  
+ μ18NFEESLGit + μ19GDPLGit + μ20ΔGDPLGit + μjYearit + μkIndustryit + εit  
ABSPDAit = β0 + β1STRAINft + β2EXCESSft + β3LGAUDITORf + β4STRAINLGft  (5) 
+ β5EXCESSLGft + β6LTAit + β7CFOit + β8LEVit + β9MKTBKit + β10DECYEit  
+ β11LTALGit + β12CFOLGit + β13LEVLGit + β14MKTBKLGit + βjYeart + εit  
where, 
LGAUDITORi = 1 if company i is audited by a Big 4 or second-tier auditor, 0 
otherwise; 
I then test the significance of the coefficients on the interaction terms STRAINLG and 
EXCESSLG to determine if the effects of strained and excess capacity in each of the 
models are significantly smaller for those companies audited by the Big 4 and second-
tier audit firms.  
Portfolio Management Decisions 
 In order to test H3, I define mismatches using the methodology described in Shu 
(2000). First, I estimate the following logit model separately for each year on the full 
sample of client-year observations. 
                                                 
18 As a robustness check, I estimate the model under two alternative specifications using an indicator 
variable for Big 4 only or indicator variables for each large audit firm separately. Results are robust to 
these alternative specifications. 
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LGAUDITORi = ρ0 + ρ1LTAit + ρ2ACQUISITIONit + ρ3ΔFINANCINGit  (6) 
 
+ ρ4PROFITABILITYit + ρ5MKTBKit + εit  
where, 
ACQUISITIONit = acquisitions per the cash flow statement divided by average total 
assets; 
FINANCINGit = total debt and stock issuances from the cash flow statement 
divided by average total assets; 
PROFITABILITYit = income before extraordinary items divided by average total 
assets; 
MKTBKit = market value of equity scaled by book value of common equity. 
I then multiply the respective yearly estimated coefficients by the actual values 
from each observation. As in Shu (2000), I use these estimations to determine the 
optimal yearly cutoffs that minimize the two types of misclassification rates (expected 
to be audited by a large audit firm when it is not and expected to not be audited by a 
large audit firm when it is). 19 I use the estimates from each observation and the cutoff 
to determine whether an observation is expected to be audited by a large audit firm or 
not. I then create the variable MISMATCH1 which is equal to one if a client is audited 
by a small audit firm when it is expected to be audited by a large audit firm, zero 
otherwise, and MISMATCH2 which is equal to one if a client is audited by a large audit 
firm when it is expected to be audited by a small audit firm, zero otherwise. I restrict the 
sample to those observations that are first year audit engagements and estimate the 
following logit model.  
                                                 
19 Cutoffs were as follows: .55 in 2004, .55 in 2005, .53 in 2006, .55 in 2007, .57 in 2008, and .62 in 
2009. 
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MISMATCH(1 or 2)ft = σ0 + σ1STRAINft + σ2EXCESSft + σ3AFEESit + σ4NFEESit (7) 
 
+ σ5GDPit + σ6ΔGDPit + σ7HERFmt + σ8DECYEft + σkYeart + σkIndustryt + εit  
where, 
MISMATCH1ft = 1 if a client is audited by a small audit firm when it is expected to 
be audited by a large audit firm, zero otherwise; 
MISMATCH2ft = 1 if a client is audited by a large audit firm when it is expected to 
be audited by a small audit firm, zero otherwise; 
HERFmt = the industry Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared 
industry market shares (in audit fees) of all local audit offices in 
an MSA (m); 
and all other variables as previously defined.  
 I control for audit fees (AFEES) and nonaudit fees (NFEES) paid to the auditor 
as a large audit firm may be willing to serve a company it would not typically serve if 
the fees are high enough. I also control for city level economic conditions (GDP and 
ΔGDP) that may affect an audit firm’s willingness to serve a client as well as local audit 
firm concentration (HERF) and fiscal year end (DECYE) as concentration and audit 
timing may affect the auditor-client matching decision. H3 predicts that σ1 will be 
negative, while H3 predicts that σ2 will be positive.  
Mismatch Effect on Audit Quality 
H4a predicts that auditor-client mismatches where clients typically served by 
large audit firms are served by small audit firms will result in lower audit quality. 
Similarly, H4b predicts that mismatches where clients typically served by small audit 
firms are served by large audit firms will result in higher audit quality.  I test these 
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hypotheses using tests of differences in means and the following multiple regression 
model: 
ABSPDAit = λ0 + λ1MISMATCH1ft + λ2MISMATCH2ft + λ3LTAit + λ4CFOit  (8) 
+ λ5LEVit + λ6MKTBKit + λ7DECYEit + λjYeart + εit  
where all variables are as previously described. 
 H4a predicts that λ1 will be positive and H4b predicts that λ2 will be negative. 
Additional variables are included in the model which have been shown in prior 
literature to influence discretionary accruals as previously described. In response to 
Lawrence et al.’s (2011) suggestion to use matched samples when testing audit quality 
difference between audits performed by Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms, I estimate the 
model after matching mismatches with non-mismatches with the closest propensity 
score estimated using Model 6.   
V. RESULTS 
 Table 1 and Table 2 present descriptive statistics and correlations for both the 
GCO and DA samples used to test H1 and H2. The GCO sample contains 8,845 client-
year observations of which 7,443 (84.1 percent) are audited by the Big 4 or second-tier 
audit firms, 615 (7 percent) are identified as being audited by audit firms with strained 
capacity, and 266 (3 percent) are identified as being audited by audit firms with excess 
capacity. The GCO sample includes 264 bankruptcies. The industries with the greatest 
number of bankruptcies represented in the sample are the computer equipment and 
services industry (SIC codes 35 and 73) with 46, the chemicals and allied products 
industry (SIC code 28) with 33, and the electronics equipment industry (SIC code 36) 
with 26 client-year observations. In the GCO sample, there are 724 identified Type I 
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errors (343 by Big 4 and  second tier auditors) and 143 Type II errors (110 by Big 4 and 
second tier auditors).  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 Here] 
 Results of the first test of H1 and H2 are illustrated in Table 4. Column 1 and 
Column 2 in Table 4 show logistic estimations of Model 1 under two specifications with 
the dependent variable TYPEII. The coefficients on STRAIN and EXCESS in these two 
estimates are insignificant at conventional levels as are the coefficients on the 
interaction terms STRAINLG and EXCESSLG. Client size (LTA) is negatively 
correlated with the occurrence of Type II errors and Altman’s z-score (Z) is positively 
correlated with the occurrence of Type II errors as expected. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 is TYPEI. The coefficient 
on STRAIN in the full sample is positive and significant at the .10 level and the 
coefficients on EXCESS are insignificant at conventional levels. These results indicate 
that clients served by audit firms with strained capacity are more likely to have Type I 
going-concern opinion errors consistent with the hypothesis that strained capacity 
results in lower audit quality. The interaction terms STRAINLG and EXCESSLG are 
insignificantly correlated with Type I errors inconsistent with H2. 
 As a second test of H1 and H2, I use a measure of discretionary accruals 
calculated using the modified Jones model as described by Dechow et al. (1995) 
adjusted for performance as described by Kothari et al. (2005). There are 8,845 
observations in the DA sample. Table 5 illustrates the results of this test. The coefficient 
estimates on STRAIN and EXCESS are both positive and significant at the .01 level 
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indicating that clients served by audit firms with strained or excess capacity have lower 
audit quality as measured by discretionary accruals. The coefficient on the interaction 
term STRAINLG is negative and significant at the .01 level consistent with the negative 
consequences of strained capacity being lower for local offices of the Big 4 and second-
tier audit firms. The coeffeicient on the interaction term EXCESSLG is negative, but 
insignificant. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 Table 6 presents descriptive data and correlations for the sample used to test H3. 
The sample includes 1,276 first year audit observation with 83 (6.5 percent) mismatches 
where clients expected to be served by large audit firms are served by smaller audit 
firms (MISMATCH1) and 112 (8.8 percent) mismatches where clients expected to be 
served by small audit firms are served by large audit firms (MISMATCH2). The sample 
also includes 94 (7.4 percent) clients served by auditors with strained capacity and 32 
(2.5 percent) clients served by auditors with excess capacity. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 Results of the estimation of Model 7 are shown in Table 7. The dependent 
variable in column 1 is MISMATCH1. The coefficient on EXCESS is insignificantly 
different from zero. The coefficient on STRAIN is positive and significant indicating 
that strained audit firm capacity does not dissuade small audit firms from accepting new 
clients that are typically served by larger audit firms. A possible explanation for this 
unexpected result is that all mismatches are not less preferred by audit firms. Shu 
(2000) and Landsman et al. (2009) do not differentiate between the two distinct types of 
mismatches. Anecdotal evidence suggests that small audit firms may desire to pick up 
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clients typically served by the Big 4 or second tier audit firms any time they can 
because serving such clients helps smaller firms establish credibility. 
Column 2 shows estimation of Model 7 with MISMATCH2 as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient on STRAIN is negative and significant supporting H3 that 
mismatches are less likely when an audit firm has strained capacity. Again, the 
coefficient on EXCESS is insignificantly different from zero. Audit fees are negatively 
correlated with MISMATCH1 and MISMATCH2 indicating that mismatches may 
result in lower audit fees.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 Table 8 shows descriptive statistics and correlation tables related to the full 
sample and matched sample used to test H4. The full sample includes 21,693 firm-year 
observations from 2004 through 2009 with 1,604 (7.4 percent) mismatches where 
clients typically served by large audit firms are served by smaller audit firms 
(MISMATCH1) and 1,576 (7.3 percent) mismatches where clients typically served by 
small audit firms are served by large audit firms (MISMATCH2). The matched sample 
has 6,360 observations with 3,180 mismatches and 3,180 nonmismatches.  
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 Here] 
Table 9 Column 1 presents the two-sample test of means between those 
company-year observations in the unmatched sample with MISMATCH1 and 
MISMATCH2 and those company-year observations with no mismatches. Test statistics 
indicate that both the MISMATCH1 and MISMATCH2 samples have mean absolute 
values of performance-matched discretionary accruals lower than those company-year 
observations with no mismatches, providing evidence that rather than impairing audit 
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quality, mismatches may actually result in greater audit quality. The estimation of 
Model 8 with the full sample in Column 2 provides similar results where the coefficient 
on MISMATCH2 is negative and significant at the.01 levels, however, the coefficient 
on MISMATCH1 is insignificant. Utilizing the matched sample design, the coefficient 
MISMATCH2 remains negative and significant; however, the coefficient on 
MISMATCH1 becomes positive and significant at the .01 level. The change in sign 
supports the importance in controlling for differences in client characteristics described 
by Francis and Lennox (2008) and Lawrence et al. (2011). In summary, the results 
support H4a and H4b that when large audit firms perform the audit of clients typically 
served by smaller audit firms it is correlated with greater audit quality. However, when 
smaller audit firms perform the audits of clients typically served by large audit firms it 
is correlated with lower audit quality, at least in the matched sample design.  
Additional Robustness Checks, Additional Analyses, and Limitations 
 As alternative measures of Type I and Type II going-concern errors, I expand 
the window over which I measure both from one-year subsequent to the opinion date to 
two and three years subsequent to the opinion date. Under each of these additional 
specifications results are similar to those previously reported. Type II going-concern 
errors remain uncorrelated with STRAIN and EXCESS. Additionally, I redefine Type I 
(Type II) going-concern errors as occurring if a company received a going concern 
opinion and did not (did) subsequently go bankrupt, merge with another company, or 
become delisted or liquidated.  Results are again similar to those previously reported. 
 Next, I evaluate the effect of strained and excess audit office capacity on audit 
quality on clients with December and non-December year ends. Results of Model 5 
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estimated on these two samples are shown in Table 10. These results show that the 
effect of strained and excess capacity on audit quality are significant for December year 
end clients, but not for non-December year end clients. However, in an untabulated 
estimation the difference between the effects of strained and excess capacity on the 
absolute value of performance matched discretionary accruals in the two samples is 
insignificantly different from zero. This lack of significance may be due to a lack of 
power in the smaller samples.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
As in all archival studies, this study has its limitations. Ideally, information 
related to the audit of private companies would be available in addition to the public 
company information that was used. This same limitation applies to extant literature on 
auditor industry specialization and auditor concentration. However, to a large extent the 
experience and skills needed to perform audits of public companies is differentiable 
from those needed to perform audits of private companies, especially for higher 
seniority positions. Additionally, significant effort was made in this study to use as 
much information as could be obtained through collecting auditor city information that 
was absent in Audit Analytics. 
 Additionally, information related to audit hours and number of employees in a 
local audit office would be ideal for determining periods of strained or excess capacity; 
however, such information is not made available by audit firms. That being said, 
identifying local audit offices that are more likely to have strained or excess capacity by 
extreme changes in clientele fits well in the context of the questions being addressed in 
this study as mandatory audit firm rotation would result in swings in auditor clientele. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 As regulators weigh the costs and benefits of mandating audit firm rotation, they 
should consider the impact such regulation would have on audit firms’ capacity at the 
local office level and on auditor-client alignments. While this study does not directly 
test the effects of a transition into mandatory audit firm rotation in the US market, it 
does test how possible consequences of mandating audit firm rotation may affect audit 
quality. Two potential consequences of mandatory audit firm rotation are 1) it increases 
the volatility of local audit offices’ client portfolios and increases the likelihood of local 
audit offices having periods of strained or excess capacity, and 2) it increases the 
likelihood of auditor-client mismatches occurring, especially in locations/industries 
where there are few rotation opportunities available.  
 In this study, I investigate the effects of strained and excess audit firm capacity 
at the local level on audit quality and whether such effects are contingent upon the size 
and structure of the audit firm.  I provide evidence that audit quality is negatively 
affected by both strained and excess audit firm capacity. Further, I find evidence that 
the negative effect of strained capacity on audit quality is smaller for the Big 4 and 
second tier audit firms, supporting the flexibility and reputation hypotheses. 
I further investigate the effect of strained and excess capacity on an audit firm’s 
client acceptance decisions. I find that mismatches, where a large audit firm accepts a 
client expected to be served by a small audit firm, are less likely to occur when a large 
audit firm has strained capacity. Unexpectedly, I find that mismatches, where a small 
audit firm accepts a client expected to be served by a large audit firms, are more likely 
to occur when a small audit firm has strained capacity. This result may indicate the 
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desire of smaller audit firms to win clients from larger firms.  I find no correlation 
between excess capacity and auditor-client mismatches. 
 Finally, I investigate the effect of auditor-client mismatches on audit quality. I 
find that audit quality is positively affected when a large audit firm performs the audit 
for a company expected to be served by a smaller audit firm and is negatively affected 
when a small audit firm performs the audit for a company expected to be served by a 
larger audit firm.  
 This study bridges the auditing and operations management literatures while 
addressing an area of concern for regulators. In this study, I consider audit firms as 
other service businesses which face operating challenges such as that of managing 
capacity levels. I believe that more research is needed in this area. Future research 
should look at other managerial and operational characteristics of auditing firms and 
their implications for important audit topics including audit quality, concentration, 
specialization, and portfolio management. This research will be especially beneficial in 
the context of regulation that has the potential to effect audit firms’ operational 
decisions. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Going-Concern Sample Selection 
                          
Observations 
Merged Audit Analytics and Compustat Client-Year observations from  42,129 
January 01, 2004 to December 31, 2009 where Compustat data are available  
Plus: Added auditor city information     3,355 
Less: Observations from 2004 and 2005 for STRAIN and EXCESS measures (15,877) 
Less: Observations in financial industries   (10,101) 
Less: Observations with local audit offices which merged during the sample period   (4,463) 
Less: Observations with fewer than three public clients in an MSA      (821) 
Less: Initial year audits      (781) 
Less: Observations that are not financially distressed    (4,596) 
Going-concern opinion sample      8,845 
 
Panel B: Discretionary Accruals Sample Selection 
 
Merged Audit Analytics and Compustat Client-Year observations from  46,429 
January 01, 2004 to December 31, 2009 where Compustat data are available 
Plus: Added auditor city information     3,355 
Less: Observations in industries with fewer than 20 observations    (11,256) 
Less: Observations in financial industries       (16,835) 
Discretionary accruals sample for testing Hypothesis 4 21,693 
Less: Observations from 2004 and 2005 for STRAIN and EXCESS measures (7,229) 
Less: Observations with audit firms which merged during the sample period (2,207)  
Less: Observations with fewer than three clients in an MSA    (406)  
Less: Initial year audits     (896) 
Discretionary accruals sample for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2  10,955 
Add back: Initial year audits 896 
Plus: Observations where Compustat is available due to different model variables           380 
Less: Non-intitial year audits (10,955) 
Initial audit sample for testing Hypothesis 3    1,276 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Data – GCO and DA Samples 
Panel A - GCO Sample (N= 8,845)
  Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
TYPE1 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TYPE2 0.016 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STRAIN 0.070 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXCESS 0.030 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STRAINLG 0.031 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXCESSLG 0.022 0.145 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LGAUDITOR 0.841 0.365 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LTA 5.594 2.283 3.971 5.545 7.174 
Z -8.458 21.694 -7.490 -1.215 0.474 
ΔZ -0.520 12.628 -1.556 -0.132 0.684 
AFEES 13.486 1.282 12.660 13.563 14.322 
NFEES 9.697 4.433 9.321 11.106 12.433 
GDP 10.907 0.196 10.778 10.905 11.007 
ΔGDP -0.002 0.031 -0.025 -0.001 0.016 
DECYE 0.734 0.442 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
Panel B - DA Sample (N= 10,955)
Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
ABSPDA 0.081 0.107 0.019 0.045 0.098 
STRAIN 0.069 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXCESS 0.031 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STRAINLG 0.037 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXCESSLG 0.025 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LGAUDITOR 0.874 0.332 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LTA 5.914 2.170 4.427 5.949 7.439 
CFO 0.031 0.244 0.004 0.082 0.148 
LEV 0.181 0.229 0.000 0.104 0.282 
MKTBK 2.753 5.264 1.107 1.937 3.421 
DECYE 0.684 0.465 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Type I = 1 if a Type I error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
Type II = 1 if a Type II error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
STRAIN = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a percentage increase in MSA 
total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise;  
EXCESS = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a percentage decrease in 
MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 
STRAINLG = the interaction between STRAIN and LGAUDITOR; 
EXCESSLG = the interaction between EXCESS and LGAUDITOR; 
LGAUDITOR = 1 if company i is audited by a Big 4 or second-tier auditor, 0 otherwise; 
LTA = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
Z = Altman’s (2000) z-score for nonmanufacturing firms ranked from 0 to 9 by two-digit SIC code; ΔZ = change in a company’s Altman’s Z-score from t-1 to t; 
AFEES = log of total audit fees paid by company i for a first year audit engagement; 
NFEES = log of total nonaudit fees plus one; 
GDP = yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ΔGDP = change in yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ABSPDA = the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the model derived in Jones (1991) and 
further modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005); 
CFO = operating cash flows at time t divided by lagged total assets, 
LEV = total debt at time t divided by lagged total assets, 
MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at year end; 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Tables – GCO and DA Samples 
 
Panel A -GCO Sample (N= 8,845) 
  TYPEI TYPEII STRAIN EXCESS STRAINLG EXCESSLG LGAUDITOR LTA Z ΔZ AFEES NFEES GDP ΔGDP DECYE 
TYPE1 1.000  
TYPE2 -0.038*** 1.000  
STRAIN 0.100*** 0.002 1.000  
EXCESS 0.005 0.015 -0.016 1.000  
STRAINLG -0.017 -0.001 0.550*** -0.009 1.000  
EXCESSLG -0.023** 0.014 -0.012 0.782*** -0.007 1.000  
LGAUDITOR -0.301*** -0.025** -0.237*** -0.061*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 1.000  
LTA -0.352*** -0.051*** -0.161*** -0.043*** -0.034*** 0.019* 0.513*** 1.000  
Z -0.392*** -0.005 -0.050*** -0.029*** 0.003 0.009 0.247*** 0.383*** 1.000  
ΔZ 0.053*** -0.004 0.053*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.062*** -0.036*** 0.016 1.000  
AFEES -0.290*** -0.038*** -0.194*** -0.061*** -0.044*** 0.008 0.591*** 0.854*** 0.284*** -0.050*** 1.000  
NFEES -0.180*** -0.011 -0.114*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.013 0.260*** 0.429*** 0.177*** -0.029*** 0.445*** 1.000  
GDP -0.018* 0.008 -0.045*** -0.063*** -0.021** -0.063*** 0.048*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.002 0.087*** -0.028*** 1.000  
ΔGDP 0.011 0.015 -0.011 -0.022** -0.001 -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.089*** -0.025** 0.012 -0.048*** -0.024** 0.313*** 1.000  
DECYE 0.010 -0.020* -0.020* -0.018* -0.013 0.002 0.064*** 0.128*** -0.008 0.009 0.095*** 0.010 -0.044*** -0.006 1.000 
 
Panel B - DA Sample (N=10,958) 
*,**,*** Pearson correlations are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
Type I = 1 if a Type I error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
Type II = 1 if a Type II error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
STRAIN = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a percentage increase in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise;  
EXCESS = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a percentage decrease in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 
STRAINLG = the interaction between STRAIN and LGAUDITOR; 
EXCESSLG = the interaction between EXCESS and LGAUDITOR; 
LGAUDITOR = 1 if company i is audited by a Big 4 or second-tier auditor, 0 otherwise; 
LTA = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
Z = Altman’s (2000) z-score for nonmanufacturing firms ranked from 0 to 9 by two-digit SIC code; 
ΔZ = change in a company’s Altman’s Z-score from t-1 to t; 
AFEES = log of total audit fees paid by company i for a first year audit engagement; 
NFEES = log of total nonaudit fees plus one; 
GDP = yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ΔGDP = change in yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ABSPDA =  absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the model derived in Jones (1991) and further modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005); 
CFO = operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets, 
LEV = total long-term debt scaled by total assets, 
MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at year end. 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
  ABSPDA STRAIN EXCESS STRAINLG EXCESSLG LGAUDITOR LTA CFO LEV MKTBK DECYE  
ABSPDA 1.000  
STRAIN 0.100*** 1.000  
EXCESS 0.030*** -0.014 1.000  
STRAINLG -0.001 0.603*** -0.008 1.000  
EXCESSLG -0.010 -0.011 0.836*** -0.007 1.000  
LGAUDITOR -0.309*** -0.218*** -0.049*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 1.000  
LTA -0.378*** -0.149*** -0.034*** -0.030*** 0.015 0.489*** 1.000  
CFO -0.373*** -0.071*** -0.023** -0.006 0.013 0.266*** 0.448*** 1.000  
LEV -0.014 -0.020** 0.004 -0.009 0.022** 0.088*** 0.231*** -0.018* 1.000  
MKTBK 0.060*** 0.007 -0.02** -0.005 -0.014 -0.019** -0.035*** -0.013 -0.096*** 1.000  
DECYE 0.024** 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.009 0.023** 0.072*** -0.055*** 0.120*** 0.002 1.000     
[Type 
a 
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TABLE 4 
Results of Going-Concern Opinion Error Test 
 
    Type IIa   Type Ia 
  Sign 1 2b   3 4b 
Constant -4.876 -5.798 3.735 5.223 
(0.82) (1.12) (1.48) (1.26) 
STRAIN +/- -0.321 -0.429 0.395 0.296 
(0.88) (0.85) (7.86***) (2.99*) 
EXCESS +/- 0.107 0.234 -0.226 -0.129 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.85) (0.17) 
STRAINLG +/- 0.306 -0.227 
(0.19) (0.42) 
EXCESSLG +/- -0.104 -0.602 
(0.01) (1.11) 
LGAUDITOR - -0.102 -7.518 
(0.13) (1.65) 
LTA - -0.298 -0.314 -0.768 -0.801 
(11.65***) (11.62***) (185.77***) (69.72***) 
Z - 0.010 0.010 -0.021 -0.020 
(3.55*) (3.64*) (119.45***) (62.11***) 
ΔZ - -0.014 0.010 0.008 -0.020 
(2.60) (2.53) (11.13***) (23.33***) 
AFEES + 0.101 0.122 0.368 0.430 
(0.53) (0.62) (20.23***) (9.42***) 
NFEES + 0.018 0.017 -0.021 -0.036 
(0.68) (0.60) (3.99**) (4.81**) 
GDP 0.069 0.129 -0.021 -0.709 
(0.02) (0.06) (3.73*) (2.75*) 
ΔGDP -0.611 -0.132 4.512 3.161 
(0.02) (0.00) (2.66) (0.78) 
DECYE + -0.197 -0.142  0.188 0.173 
  (1.17) (0.58)  (2.83*) (2.31) 
Likelihood Ratio 52.36 80.24 1,657.94 1,748.00 
p value <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
N   8,845 8,845   8,845 8,845 
*,**,*** Chi-square statistics are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively using two-tailed tests. 
a- Year and industry dummy variable coefficients are excluded from the table to conserve space. 
b- Interaction terms between LGAUDITOR and control variables are excluded to conserve space. 
Type I = 1 if a Type I error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
Type II = 1 if a Type II error occurred, 0 otherwise; 
STRAIN = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a percentage increase in MSA total 
assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 
EXCESS = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a percentage decrease in MSA 
total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 
STRAINLG = the interaction between STRAIN and LGAUDITOR; 
EXCESSLG = the interaction between EXCESS and LGAUDITOR; 
LGAUDITOR = 1 if company i is audited by a Big 4 or second-tier auditor, 0 otherwise; 
LTA = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
Z = Altman’s (2000) z-score for nonmanufacturing firms ranked from 0 to 9 by two-digit SIC code; 
ΔZ = change in a company’s Altman’s Z-score from t-1 to t; 
AFEES = log of total audit fees paid by company i for a first year audit engagement; 
NFEES = log of total nonaudit fees plus one; 
GDP = yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ΔGDP = change in yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 5 
Results of Discretionary Accruals Test 
 
    ABSPDAa 
  Sign 1 2 3b 
Constant 0.077 0.148 0.189 
(71.92***) (41.89***) (24.00***) 
STRAIN +/- 0.052 0.021 0.023 
(13.02***) (5.82***) (4.03***) 
EXCESS +/- 0.033 0.019 0.031 
(5.60***) (3.49***) (2.58**) 
STRAINLG +/- -0.024 
(3.20***) 
EXCESSLG +/- -0.022 
(1.63) 
LGAUDITOR - -0.062 
(7.31***) 
LTA - -0.013 -0.021 
(26.45***) (10.54***) 
CFO - -0.107 -0.175 
(25.38***) (24.89***) 
LEV - 0.022 0.043 
(5.18***) (4.05***) 
MKTBK + 0.001 0.000 
(6.17***) (0.93) 
DECYE +  0.006 0.007 
    (2.94***) (3.71***) 
Adj R-Squared 0.017 0.203 0.242 
F-Statistic 97.16 279.37 205.28 
N   10,955 10,955 10,955 
*,**,***Two-sided t-statistics are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
a- Year dummy variable coefficients are excluded from the table to conserve space. 
b- Interaction terms between LGAUDITOR and control variables are excluded to conserve space. 
ABSPDA =  the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the model derived in Jones (1991) 
and further modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005); 
STRAIN = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a percentage increase 
in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise;  
EXCESS = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a percentage 
decrease in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 
otherwise; 
STRAINLG = the interaction between STRAIN and LGAUDITOR; 
EXCESSLG = the interaction between EXCESS and LGAUDITOR; 
LGAUDITOR= 1 if company i is audited by a Big 4 or second-tier auditor, 0 otherwise; 
LTA = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
CFO = operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets, 
LEV = total long-term debt scaled by total assets, 
MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at year end. 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Data and Correlations for Hypothesis 3 Test Sample 
 
Panel A – Descriptive Data for Hypothesis 3 Sample (N=1,276) 
Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
MISMATCH1 0.065 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MISMATCH2 0.088 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STRAIN 0.074 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXCESS 0.025 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AFEES 13.134 1.360 12.193 13.253 14.064 
NFEES 7.568 5.477 0.000 10.086 11.910 
GDP 10.914 0.181 10.806 10.909 11.007 
ΔGDP 0.006 0.029 -0.008 0.011 0.022 
HERF 0.260 0.101 0.209 0.238 0.275 
DECYE 0.734 0.442 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B – Correlations for Hypothesis 3 Sample (N=1,276) 
  *,**,*** Pearson correlations significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
MISMATCH1 1 if a client is audited by a small audit firm when it is expected to be audited by a large audit firm, zero otherwise; 
MISMATCH2 1 if a client is audited by a large audit firm when it is expected to be audited by a small audit firm, zero otherwise; 
STRAIN 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a percentage increase in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 
calculated yearly, 0 otherwise;  
EXCESS 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a percentage decrease in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year 
t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 
AFEES log of total audit fees paid by company i for a first year audit engagement; 
NFEES log of total nonaudit fees plus one; 
GDP yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ΔGDP change in yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
HERF the industry Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared industry market shares (in audit fees) of all local audit offices in an MSA; 
DECYE 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
1- MISMATCH1 1.000  
2-MISMATCH2 -0.082*** 1.000  
3- STRAIN 0.104*** -0.037 1.000  
4- EXCESS 0.024 0.027 -0.044 1.000  
5- AFEES -0.172*** -0.206*** -0.149*** -0.135*** 1.000  
6- NFEES -0.095*** -0.104*** -0.081*** -0.030 0.393*** 1.000  
7 - GDP 0.068** -0.007 -0.005 -0.037 0.087*** -0.007 1.000  
8- ΔGDP 0.062** -0.087*** 0.011 -0.043 -0.021 -0.039 0.362*** 1.000  
9- HERF -0.068** 0.011 0.057** 0.065** 0.080*** 0.094*** -0.322*** -0.128*** 1.000  
10- DECYE -0.064** 0.017 0.025 -0.027 0.046 0.025 -0.076*** -0.054* -0.002 1.000  
[Type 
a 
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TABLE 7 
Results of Mismatch Test 
 
  Sign Mismatch1a Mismatch2a 
Constant -37.364 -9.669 
(13.92***) (1.67) 
STRAIN - 0.848 -0.799 
(5.13**) (2.91*) 
EXCESS + -0.344 -0.354 
(0.13) (0.35) 
AFEES -0.544 -0.643 
(26.55***) (42.77***) 
NFEES -0.021 -0.033 
(0.67) (2.42) 
GDP 3.776 1.065 
(16.18***) (2.35) 
ΔGDP -15.357 -11.206 
(4.14**) (3.11*) 
HERF -2.155 1.639 
(1.07) (2.25) 
DECYE - -0.245 0.292 
  (0.75) (1.22) 
Likelihood Ratio 147.242 164.028 
p value <0.001*** <0.001*** 
N   1,276 1,276 
   *,**,*** Chi-square statistics are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
a- Year and industry dummy variable coefficients are excluded from the table to conserve space. 
MISMATCH1 = 1 if a client is audited by a small audit firm when it is expected to be audited by 
a large audit firm, zero otherwise; 
MISMATCH2 = 1 if a client is audited by a large audit firm when it is expected to be audited by 
a small audit firm, zero otherwise; 
STRAIN = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a percentage 
increase in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 
0 otherwise;  
EXCESS = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a 
percentage decrease in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 
calculated yearly, 0 otherwise; 
AFEES = log of total audit fees paid by company i for a first year audit engagement; 
NFEES = log of total nonaudit fees plus one; 
GDP = yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
ΔGDP = change in yearly GDP per capita per local audit office’s MSA; 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Data and Correlations for Hypothesis 4 Test Sample 
 
Panel A – Descriptive Data for Hypothesis 4 Samples 
Full Sample (N=21,693) Matched Sample (N=6,360) 
Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median 
Third 
Quartile Mean Std Dev
First 
Quartile Median 
Third 
Quartile
ABSPDA 0.099 0.136 0.021 0.051 0.115 0.131 0.158 0.032 0.076 0.165 
MISMATCH1 0.074 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.252 0.434 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MISMATCH2 0.073 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.248 0.432 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTA 5.372 2.287 3.704 5.340 6.994 3.667 1.191 2.894 3.627 4.430 
CFO -0.001 0.304 -0.027 0.071 0.142 -0.106 0.424 -0.178 0.006 0.111 
LEV 0.173 0.231 0.000 0.085 0.270 0.123 0.225 0.000 0.012 0.154 
MKTBK 2.874 6.147 1.133 2.022 3.608 2.929 7.581 0.919 1.882 3.758 
DECYE 0.675 0.468 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.657 0.475 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B – Correlations for Hypothesis 4 Samples 
  ABSPDA MISMATCH1 MISMATCH2 LTA CFO LEV MKTBK DECYE 
Full Sample (N=21,693) 
ABSPDA 1.000 
MISMATCH1 0.033*** 1.000 
MISMATCH2 0.097*** -0.079*** 1.000 
LTA -0.421*** -0.104*** -0.316*** 1.000 
CFO -0.418*** 0.001 -0.182*** 0.431*** 1.000 
LEV -0.024*** -0.035*** -0.068*** 0.205*** -0.027*** 1.000 
MKTBK 0.043*** -0.025*** 0.008 -0.026*** -0.042*** -0.115*** 1.000 
DECYE 0.019*** 0.020*** -0.029*** 0.078*** -0.051*** 0.100*** 0.018*** 1.000 
Matched Sample (N=6,360) 
PDA 1.000 
MISMATCH1 -0.055*** 1.000 
MISMATCH2 0.061*** -0.333*** 1.000 
LTA -0.296*** 0.417*** -0.418*** 1.000 
CFO -0.386*** 0.140*** -0.148*** 0.349*** 1.000 
LEV 0.253*** -0.049*** 0.074 -0.215*** -0.232*** 1.000 
MKTBK 0.013 -0.050*** 0.007 -0.096*** -0.093*** -0.170*** 1.000 
DECYE 0.035*** 0.064*** -0.037*** 0.069*** -0.111*** 0.031*** 0.012 1.000 
  *,**,*** Pearson correlations are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
ABSPDA =  the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the model derived in Jones (1991) and 
further modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005); 
MISMATCH1 = 1 if a client is audited by a small audit firm when it is expected to be audited by a large audit 
firm, zero otherwise; 
MISMATCH2 = 1 if a client is audited by a large audit firm when it is expected to be audited by a small audit 
firm, zero otherwise; 
LTA = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
CFO = operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets, 
LEV = total long-term debt scaled by total assets, 
MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at year end. 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 9 
Results of Discretionary Accruals-Mismatch Test 
 
    ABSPDAa 
Unmatched Matched 
  Sign Difference
b 
in Means 
Multiple 
Regression  
Differenceb 
in Means 
Multiple 
Regression 
Constant 0.191 0.237 
(62.34***) (29.25***) 
MISMATCH1 + -0.021 -0.002 0.0261 0.024 
(6.08***) (0.62) (5.62***) (5.20***) 
MISMATCH2 - -0.053 -0.029 -0.0218 -0.024 
(14.94***) (8.91***) (3.69***) (5.21***) 
LTA - -0.019 -0.033 
(45.98***) (16.73***) 
CFO - -0.127 -0.118 
(43.14***) (25.87***) 
LEV + 0.018 0.025 
(5.08***) (3.14***) 
MKTBK + 0.001 -0.001 
(4.61***) (2.86***) 
DECYE + 0.007 -0.001 
(4.09***) (2.86***) 
Adj R-Squared 0.251 0.190 
F-Statistic 605.73 124.36 
N   21,693     6,360 
   *,**,*** Two-sided t-statistics are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
a- Year dummy variable coefficients are excluded from the table to conserve space. 
b- An independent samples t-test was used in the unmatched sample and a paired samples t-test was used 
in the matched sample. 
ABSPDA =  the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the model derived in Jones (1991) and 
further modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005); 
MISMATCH1 = 1 if a client is audited by a small audit firm when it is expected to be audited by a large audit 
firm, zero otherwise; 
MISMATCH2 = 1 if a client is audited by a large audit firm when it is expected to be audited by a small audit 
firm, zero otherwise; 
LTA = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
CFO = operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets, 
LEV = total long-term debt scaled by total assets, 
MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at year end. 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 10 
Results of Discretionary Accruals Test 
 
    ABSPDA 
  Sign December Year Enda 
Non-December 
Year Enda 
Constant 0.176 0.221 
(16.40***) (20.04***) 
STRAIN +/- 0.030 0.013 
(3.85***) (1.54) 
EXCESS +/- 0.033 0.017 
(1.94*) (1.06) 
STRAINLG +/- -0.030 -0.018 
(2.98***) (1.69*) 
EXCESSLG +/- -0.024 -0.009 
(1.30) (0.50) 
LGAUDITOR - -0.040 -0.097 
(3.46***) (8.11***) 
LTA - -0.040 -0.097 
(6.07***) (10.03***) 
CFO - -0.186 -0.157 
(20.87***) (13.36***) 
LEV - 0.060 0.010 
(4.56***) (0.57) 
MKTBK + 0.000 0.000 
(1.21) (0.49) 
DECYE + 0.000 -0.002 
(0.15) (0.44) 
Adj R-Squared 0.228 0.284 
F-Statistic 138.27 85.31 
N   7,489 3,466 
*,**,***Two-sided t-statistics are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
a- Year dummy variable coefficients and interaction terms between LGAUDITOR and control variables 
are excluded from the table to conserve space. 
ABSPDA =  the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the model derived in Jones (1991) 
and further modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005); 
STRAIN = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the top decile of audit firms having a percentage increase in 
MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 otherwise;  
EXCESS = 1 if company i’s auditor is in the bottom decile of audit firms having a percentage 
decrease in MSA total assets audited from year t-2 to year t-1 calculated yearly, 0 
otherwise; 
STRAINLG = the interaction between STRAIN and LGAUDITOR; 
EXCESSLG = the interaction between EXCESS and LGAUDITOR; 
LGAUDITOR = 1 if company i is audited by a Big 4 or second-tier auditor, 0 otherwise; 
LTA = log of company i’s year end total assets; 
CFO = operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets, 
LEV = total long-term debt scaled by total assets, 
MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at year end. 
DECYE = 1 if company has a December year end, 0 otherwise. 
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FIGURE 1 
Going Concern Opinion Decisions and Errors 
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